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CHAPTER 3

DISPUTE RESOLUTION BETWEEN THE
GENE RAL MOTORS CORPORATION
AN D THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE
WORKERS, 1970-19 82
T.

ST. ANTOI

E

I . COMPANY AND UNION: HI S TORY AN D
ORGAN IZATIO N

A. THE GENERAL MOTORS CO RPOR ATION
I . O RI G IN AN D G R OWT H

General Motors (GM) was o rganize d in 1908 by William Crapo Durant
( 1861- 194 7), an a utomobile e nthusiast and a born pro mote r who had made
the Buick the be t- e llin g car in the industry. Starting as a holding company , the
new firm quick ly acq uired th e manufac turers of th e Buick , th e Oldsmobil e, and
the adi llac, a well a of Fisher a uto bodie . Within a d ecade General Motors
added the Oak la nd (later Ponti ac) a nd Chevrolet motor car companies and the
producer of th e Frigidaire e lectric refrigerator. In 19 J 9 a wholly owned
subsidiar . the Genera l Motors Acceptance Corporation , was created to
finan ce the sa le of the parent company's cars and trucks . Du ra nt overextended
GM fina ncially in th e ea rl y 1920s, however. and had to g ive way to the du
Pon ts. who held a cont ro lling interest in th e company fo r the nex t forty yea rs.
nder the leade r hip of astute, meth od ica l Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.
( 1875- 1966), who served fir t as president and late r a chief executive officer,
Genera l Moto rs became th e mode l of effic ie nt American co rporate management during the eco nd quarter of the twentieth century. Th e loose collection
of individual units that characterized GM in th e Durant era was tra n formed
into a n integra ted whole. Th e aim was to coordinate th e co mpany's va rio u
divisions so as to provide 'a car fo r eve ry pur e' . Po licy ma king a nd ultimate
contro l we re centralized in Det roit , a lthough th e head s of the opera tin g
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divisions continued to exercise considerable discretion in production a nd
marketing.
By 1978, just prior to th e current econom ic recessio n, the company had
assets of more than 30 billi on dollars, annual sales of over 60 billion dollars.
including 9.4 million motor vehicl es worldwide , and yearly profits of about 3.5
billion dollars. It had plants and warehousing facilities in two dozen countries.
With a n average total work force of approximately 800,000 person , it was the
large t private employer in the world. Since the mid- I 930s General Motors had
consi tently ra nked first among a ll industrial enterprises in the United States.
In the ea rly 1980s, following several years of declining car ales, the picture
was less bright. The company lost money in 1980 for the first time si nce the
Depression . Corporate earnin gs for 1982 rem ained below one million dollars.
Signs of retrenchment included the sale after sixty years of the Frigidaire
operation. Eve n so, General Motors continues as a colossus of American
industry. It has some 120 pl a nts in this country a lo ne, another seven in Canada,
and thirty-five subsidi aries aro und th e world. Although its products range from
diese l locomo tives to ball bearings, th e heart of th e enterprise has a lways been
the motor ve hicl e, and General Motors still produces one out of eve ry four
a utom obiles m a nufactured in the world .

2. WORK FORCE

During 1973, a fairly typical year preceding the wildly fluctuating period of the
last decade , General Motors' work force in th e United State consisted on th e
average of 140,000 salaried (white-collar) employees and 450,000 hourly
(blue-collar) employee . The blue-collar total included about 70.000 ski lled
trade men. Of the grand total of app rox im ately 600,000 employees, about
115,000 were minorities (blacks , Hi spanics, e tc .) and about 95,000 were
female. Less th an 15 per cent of the worker in the automobile plants were
women a nd only a ha ndfu l of these were foremen. About 30 per cent of the
blue-collar workers were black. a lth o ugh black made up 60 to 70 per cent of
the workers on many urban assemb ly lines, often handling the noi iest, dirtiest,
and most tiring jobs. Forty per cent of the blue-collar workers were under 30
yea rs of age, and differences in the life styles of thi s 1960s generat ion often
contributed to ten sions between them and th eir middle-aged superviso rs and
union represe ntatives.
In 1973 the United Automobile Worke rs (UAW) represented between
410,000 a nd 425,000 hourly workers in about 150 bargaining units across the
country. The Internation al Uni o n of Electrical Work ers (lUE) represented
a nother 30,000 employees in five units. Blue-collar e mploym e nt peaked in
1978-79, with over 460,000 represented by th e UAW and 30,000 by the I UE.
By 1979 more than 125 ,000 women were working for GM in the Un ited States,
but o nl y 1,500 held first-line superv isory positions. Minorities were fa ring
better. They constituted about 20 per cent of the total GM labor force,
occupying, 17,500 - o r almost 12 per cent - of th e 150,000 white-collar
positions, including 9 per cent of the company's highest ranki ng 56,500
' officials and manager ' slots.

IT E D STATES
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8. THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS
I. ORIGIN A

D GROWTH

John L. Lewis (1880-1969) , famed longti me president of the United Mine
Workers , formed the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO , later the
Congress of Industrial Orga niza tions) in 1935 after he became frustrated with
the inability o r disinclination of th e older, more conservative, craft-oriented
America n Federatio n of Labor (AFL) to organize the unskilled and semiskill ed wo rkers in such ma production industries as steel and autos. The
United Automobi le Workers (UA W) g rew out of this innovative effort at
orga ni zin g along indu trial or 'vertical' lines. The new union was chartered in
April 193 6. Initially the UA W belonged to both the AFL a nd the C IO but th e
tie with the former were soo n seve red .
Afte r a se ries of b itter st rikes aga in st General Moto rs, which began in la te
Decembe r 1936 and included muc h-publicized a nd hig hly controve rsial
' sit-downs' or pl a nt seizures in Flint a nd Detroit. the union won recogniti o n a nd
bargaining rig ht for it member · from GM on 11 February 1937. Th e first
nation a l ag ree ment betwee n GM a nd the UA W con ·i te d of a ingle page, in
sharp co nt rast to th e 400-page documents of today. Chry ler was orga nized
soon after GM. but Fo rd held o ut until 1941.
The ea rl y top leadership of the UA W was relatively weak, with much of the
rea l powe r be ing exercised by C IO president Lewis. All thi changed in the
years imm e di a te ly precedi ng a nd during World War II with th e e me rge nce of
Walter P. R e uth e r ( 1907- 70) , director of the union 's large GM de p artme nt , as
o ne of the most dyna mic a nd influe ntial fi g ures on the American labo r sce ne.
Throug h the late fa ll a nd winter of 1945-46 Re uth e r led a g rue ling 1 13-day
strike aga in st Genera l Mo to rs. Although the strike did no t produce a union
triump h a t the barga inin g table , the reputa ti o n for boldness a nd da ring it
ga ined Re uth e r enabled him to take th e pres ide ncy of the unio n in 1946.
Reuth e r was not to relinqui h th e po t until his death in a n airpla ne accident in
1970. Whil e lackin g Reuther's chari ·ma a nd oratorica l fl air , his successors as
AW pres ide nt, the ·cho la rl y, me ticulous Leonard Woodcock a nd the
practica l, a ffa bl e Douglas Fraser were thought by many to be more effective in
handlin g th e d ay-to-day affa irs of the union a nd in servin g the needs of its
membe rs.
It was with Re uther in its head, no ne th e less, th at th e UA W became known as
Ame ri ca '. mo t socially progre sive a nd perhaps most hig hly rega rded large
labor orga niza tion . The UAW more th a n man y o the r ~nion . was identified in
th e public mind with the movement for civil right , low-cost ho u ing, health
in urance, a nd e nvironmental protection. In actual fact, howe er, the leadership of the union had to be wary of getting too far ou t in fron t of the
membe rship in the pursuit of noble-ca u es. Th e UAW' polyethnic ra nk-a ndfile was not avid for racia l and sexua l eq uality in the work place, and in a n
e vent th e o rdinary union man was more interested in such m a terial gain a
wage in c re a ses, innova tive fringe benefits, shop safe ty, job security. and early
retire me nt.
Re uther succeeded Philip Murray as president of th e ongre. s of Indu tri al
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Organizations (CIO) in 1952, while retaining his UAW office also. In 1955 the
CIO joined with the larger, richer AFL to form the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) . George Meany,
head of the AFL, became president of the merged federation, with Reuther a
vice-president a well a head of the Industrial Union Departme nt of the
AFL-CIO.
In the United States the central labor federation has almost no part in
collective bargaining and is primarily concerned with political strategy,
lobbying, public relations, and the maintenance of interunion harmony.
Despite this limited need for collaboration, Meany and Reuther soon
developed strong philosophical and personal antagonisms. Meany was more
conservative, shrewd and intelligent but a man of few words, and he looked
with distaste on the more flamboyant and assertive Reuth er. Reuther for his
part grew restive at what he perceived as Mean y's intransigence a nd the
federation 's resistance to change. In 1968 Reuther withdrew the UAW from
the AFL-ClO. A year later he formed an uneasy Alliance for Labor Action
with the giant International Brotherhood of Te amsters, which had been
expell ed from the federation a decade earlier because of corruptio n. The
Alliance for Labor Action fell apart after Reuther's death. and after Meany's
death their successors negotiated the UA W's return to the AFL-CIO in 1981.

2 . CURRENT STATUS

At the end of I 982 the active membership of th e United Automobile Workers
stood at 1.25 million workers , belonging to about 1,600 local unions in the
United States and Canada. There were 1. 14 million Americans and 115,000
Canadians. Women accounted for 170,000 memberships in the two countries.
A fifth or more of the total may have been retired member . The UAW ranks as
the largest manufacturing union , ahead of the United Steelworkers, but behind
three unions representing truckers , school teachers, and retail e mployees.
Substantially all the blue-collar workers in th e domestic auto industry have
been organized, the vast majority by th e UAW.
In ea rl y 1983 the UAW repre ented approximately 300.000 employees
currently on the job with General Motors in the United State~. Another 25,000
were at work for GM in Canada. One-ninth or more of these would be cla ·sified
as skilled workers. In addition, about 140,000 employees were on layoff. Of
these about 80,000 had been out of work for more than one year a nd thus were
considered as laid off indefinitely. This st udy will concentrate on the 300.000
hourly workers in about 150 major bargaining units in th e United States who
are covered by the parti es· principal National Agreement.

II. COLLECT IV E BARGAINING, 1970 -82
A. STRUCTURE AND PRO

EDURES

Collective bargaining between the General Motors Corporation and the
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United A uto mobile Worke rs is ca rried on at two levels, nat ional a nd local ,
usuall y simultaneo usly. Se parate national a nd local agreements are negotiated,
ordin arily of three yea rs' duration . Provisions of the Nationa l Agreement of
course preva il over any contrary te rms in local agreements . Generally the
National Agree ment covers such basic matters as wage increases, union
represe ntation , the grievance and a rbitra tion procedure, seniority, discipline
and disc ha rge, production ta nda rds, ove rtime , leaves of abse nce, strikes and
lockouts, vaca ti o ns and holidays, safety and health , such fringe benefits as
pensions, in urance, supple menta l unempl oy ment benefits, etc. , and special
provisions relati ng to th e skill ed t rades . Local contracts deal with ' wage sca les
for each operat io n' (as distingui she d from the nationally negotiated wage
increases a pplicab le to broad catego ries of employees), job cl assifications,
local e nio rity, job transfer right , shift prefe rences, overtime equalization
among e mployees , a nd a who le ho t of wo rking conditions ra nging fro m heat,
light. and cleanlines in th e plant to parking lot arrangem e nts, the avail ability
of lock ers, toilet , and food di pe nsi ng machines, and restrictions o n the use of
tran istor ra dios.

I. NAT I ON

L NEGOT I AT I O

S

For many yea rs the tandard GM -UA W atio nal Agree ment (l ike most othe r
nation a l co ntracts in the a uto industry) has had a three-yea r te rm , ex piring o n
14 September in 1970, 1973 , 1976, and so on. Syste ma ti c preparations fo r
negotiati ng a renewa l begi n well ove r a yea r before the o ld co ntract is due to
expire. On the unio n's side th ere is a fa scin ating, ongo ing inte rpl ay be twee n the
organi zat ion 's 'p rofessio nal' ele me nts, co nsisting o f the UAW preside nt , th e
Intern at io na l Executive Boa rd . th e head of the UA W's G M Department , hi s
staff assista nts. a nd the unio n's la wye rs and econo mists, o n the o ne hand , and
on th e other hand the o rga niza ti o n's 'democratic' o r 'grass roots' ele ments,
consisting of th e G M Na tiona l Co un cil , co mposed o f th e preside nt , th e
chairman of the shop co mmittee, a nd ofte n o th er represe ntatives of each
constituent loca l union. T his Na ti o na l Council in turn is broke n down into
eleven subcouncil s, based upo n the particul a r areas of wo rk of the me mbers of
the vario us locals, e.g. , asse mbly pl ants, sta mping pla nts, fo undries, parts
warehouse , and kill ed trades. The subcouncil s have as o ne of their most
importa nt tasks the e lectio n of the e leven pe rsons who will erve, alo ng with the
head of the GM Departme nt , o n th e Nati o nal egotiatin g Committee.
The initia l for mal step fo r th e union is collecting cont ract pro po als and
recomme nda tion fro m local me mberships at meeting aero s the coun try.
Th e e reso lutio n are th e n fo rwa rded to th e UA W president, the union'
Re. olution Committee, and the a ppropria te subcoun cil s. Ba ic economic
dem and s. which wi ll te nd to be co mm o n for the major auto co mpanies, are the
spec ia l province of the pres ide nt's office and the Re o lu tio ns Co mm ittee .
Issues of particul ar re levance to GM employees will be ha nd led by th e GM
National Council and its subco un cil s. In the ea rl y sp rin g preced ing the usual
umm e r-and-fa ll negotiati ons, th e UA W holds a Special Coll ect ive Barga ining
Convention to map o verall strategy fo r th e fo rth co m ing in d ustry-wide
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bargaining. The rea fte r th e e leve n-person GM Natio na l Negotia ting Committee meets for two wee ks with th e GM Department d irector to rev iew th e
resolutions screened by th e subcouncil s and , with the help of profess io nal staff,
to put togethe r a to tal coll ective ba rgaining pack age. Fina lly, the G M Nati ona l
Council offici all y fo rmul ates the d e mands to be presented to Genera l Moto rs.
On its side, naturally. th e co mpany operates much less publicly. A lfred S.
Warren, Jr. , GM 's new vice-pres ident fo r industrial re lations, has crea te d a
pioneering Strategic Plann ing Co mmittee, which begin s meeting abo ut a yea r
prior to ba rgaining to develop optio n fo r th e co mpany's negotiators. Chaired
by an industrial psycho logist, thi s group is co mposed of some dozen persons,
including the gene ral directo r and fo ur other directo rs of labor re lat io ns, and
specialists in fringe be nefit s, fin ance, law. and pu blic re lat ions. The co mmittee
does no t e ngage in barga inin g as a group , bu t its members are in vo lved
individua ll y.
In mid-July of contract renewa l yea rs. the National Negoti ating Co mmittees
for GM and UAW customarily begin barga ining in a suite of conference roo ms
at the G e ne ral Motors Building in Detro it. T he first session is large ly
ceremonia l, with handshakes for th e news camera . a brief. genera lized
stateme nt of the union's dem and s by the UA W's presid e nt, and a sho rt
respon se by GM 's vice-president. More th an thirty or forty represe ntatives
from each side crowd around or near a ha ndso me 52-foot walnut ba rga ining
table, equipped with a series of micropho ne to enable speakers to be heard.
Within a day or so, the U AW also o pe ns separate contract ta lks with Ford,
Chrysle r, and GM-Canada .
In succeeding days the directo r of th e UA W'. GM Depa rtment prese nts a
detail ed list o f unio n pro posals, pa rtl y in wri tin g and partly orally. Th ereaft e r
the co mpany and th e union establish some fiftee n to twenty subco mmittees to
deal with pa rticul ar aspects of th e Natio nal Agree ment and other subjects in
separa te 'sideba r' sessions in sma lle r adj o ini ng conference rooms. A ll matters
must be re turned to th e ' main ta bl e' , howeve r, for final approva l. Wages
ordin arily stay at th e main table . Within a wee k or le . of the completion of the
union's sta te me nt , th e co mpany t radition all y submits its own po ·it ion statement . Exchanges of fi rm . se rio us econ o mic proposals often do not occur fo r
seve ral wee ks o r even month s.
Late in August th e UA W's Inte rn atio nal Executi e Board customa ril y
determin es which a uto co mpany will be the unio n's 'strike targe t' in t he curre nt
round of negoti ations if a settl e me nt is not reached. Since that has usually been
Ford or Chrysler and not th e giant Ge nera l Motors, ub ·equent ba rgainin g
with GM tends to proceed at a mo re leisure ly and relaxed pace, pend in g
developments e lsewhere. A t least until ve ry rece nt ly. the uni o n co uld
reasonably anticipate th at GM wo uld accept a n economic package substantiall y similar to that nego ti ated with the ' ta rget' co mpa ny. That pa tte rn may be
breakin g down , howeve r, unde r th e inte nse co mpe ti tive p ress ures now
confronting the domestic a uto indu stry.
In the rare instances whe n GM ha been th e ' target' co m pa ny. the fin al days
o f barga ining proce ding a strike dead lin e o r lead ing up to a n agree me nt depart
dramatica ll y from the tidy proced ure o utlin ed ea rlie r. T he e lecte d rank- andfil e me mbe rs of the unio n's officia l Nati o nal Negotiati ng Committee recede
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into the backgro und , alm ost no thing of signifi ca nce occurs at the ' main table',
and the critical discussions take pl ace in small , fluid sessions betwee n the
union 's top fu ll-tim e officials a nd their counte rparts from the company. There
may even be o ne-o n-one e nco unte rs between th e UA W's president and GM's
vice president o r (very rarely) corporation chairman. Only in extreme
circum stances is federa l mediation sought in GM-UAW negotiation s, or unfair
labor practice charges filed with the NLRB. Finally, the pieces of a ten tative
agreem e nt fall into pl ace. From th at point on the UAW leadership undertakes
the till-difficult ta k of per uading, in turn , the National Negotiating
Committee. the GM ational Cou ncil , and the e ntire membership to accept
the settlement. The UA W's Internatio nal Executive Board must also approve ,
before th e contract goes to the National Council. The Agreement becom es
effective o nl y when it is ratified by the unio n's members in a nationwide vote .

2. LO

AL

EGOTIATIO

S

The negotiat ion of contracts between local unions and individual plant
man agements is separate and distinct from the negotiation of the ationa l
Agreem ent . Even after th e latter has been executed, loca l me mberships retain
th e powe r to go o n strike over loca l issues. In recent yea rs so me of the most
heated controversie within the GM-UAW bargaining re lationship have
involved loca l working conditio ns, including safety problems, drudgery in the
job, and work assign me nts.
Loca l negotiations are conducted between the local union 's shop comm ittee
and the plant"s personnel or labo r relations department. The shop committee
consisb of a chairman and one add itio na l co mmitteeman for approxi mately
every 250 e mployees. A typical plant with l ,500-2,000 e mployees would have
a shop co mmittee consistin g of a chairman and six committeemen. All are
elected by the plant's work e rs, o rdin arily for two- or three-yea r te rms. The
local uni on's pre ·ident is customa ril y an administra tive official and not on the
shop committee, al though he may sit in o n negotiation s. The loca l management's team is likely to co nsist of the personnel director o r assistant personnel
director and t, o or three ge nera l fore men from different shifts and anot he r
from a ~killed trades department.
The local union membership has a major hand in preparing contract
proposals. There is little reference of questions to lega l co un se l by e ith er side in
local negotiations, alth ough plan t managemen t is more inclined to subm it
tentative language to GM headquarters for review. If se rious difficultie
develop in the barga ining, th e re may be intervention by represe nt atives from
GM's divisional level (e.g . . C hevrolet) and from th e union 's regional office.
After ratification by th e loca l union membershi p, a new co ntract must be
formall y approved by UAW headq ua rt e rs.

312

IND

STRIAL CO

Fl.lCT RESOI.

TION

8. MAJOR CONTRACTUAL ('INTEREST') DISPUTES
I. 1970

AT IO

AL AGREE 1ENT

By 1970 a quarter century had passed since Walter Reuther's fabled long trike
against GM. The union rank-and-file was clamoring once again ' to take on the
big guy'. Former GM Depa rtment director Leonard Woodcock. who had been
unexpectedly catapulted into the UAW presidency by Reuther's death in a
plane crash earlier in the year, had never had the opportunity to lead a trike
against GM , and his readine to do so became almo t a te st of his quality.
Observers have also detected peculiar tensions in th e GM-UAW relationship
that do not exist between the union and Ford or Chrysler, a result perhaps of
GM's size, power, and supposed arrogance. 'A strike against GM is not just a
strike', former UAW president Douglas Fraser ha remarked ; 'it is a cru ade'.
The convergence of all these factors, man y psychological or political rather
than economic, made a strike against GM a lmost preordai ned in 1970,
regardless of the bargaining issues at stake. GM was duly declared the ' target'
company in the negotiations that year.
The union had three final crucial demands. They were a fir t-year wage
increase of 61 .5 cents (down from an earlier demand of 96 cents); a removal of
the eight-cent-a-year ceiling on cost-of-living increases; and. in response to a
groundswell from the membership , the right to retire after thirty yea rs of
employment with the company. The closest management came to meeting
these demands was to offer a 38-cent wage increa e, liftin g of the cost-of- living
ceiling from l 6 cents under the current contract to 28 cents, and allowing
workers to retire once they reached 58 year of age with thirty years' service.
That was unaccep table , and on 14 September 1970. near midnight, the
UAW began what was to be described as the most expensive work stoppage in
US history. The strike lasted 67 days, ending on 23 November. It cost GM at
least one billion dollars in profits, and the production of 1.5 million car and
truck . Some 350,000 GM employees were officially on . trike, and a nother
150,00 person were on layoff because of the strike. The UAW had to pay o ut
160 million dollars in trike benefits, depleting its treas ury and forcing it to
mortgage property to cover debts. The federal government wa. estimated to
have lost more than one billion dollars in taxes due to th e . trik e. In the State of
Michigan alone it was calculated the re was a 375 million dollar lo sin retail
sales. The strike itself was peaceful and uneventful.
The settlement came after a brief, face-to-face meetin g between UA W
president Leonard Woodcock and GM chairman James Roche. The compa ny
then came up with a proposa l that satisfied the union 's key demands. The
average increase would be 51 cents an hour. reaching what Woodcock had
called 'the magic fifty cent circle'. The unlimited cost-of-living allowance was
restored , although payments would not begin for another year. A compromise
was reached on '30-a nd-out'. Starting l October 1971, workers with thirty
years' service could retire a t any age. But they would have to be 58 yea rs of age
(56 after 1972) to receive th e full pension of $500 a month . Younger retirees
would get reduced pensions on a graduated cale. The total package was one
which some commentator thought GM would have granted and the UAW
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leadership would have accepted in September before the strike began . Without
the attritional effects of the trike , however, it is specu lated that the settlement
could not have been sold to the union's membership. The strike was the price of
contract ratification.

2. 1973 . 19 76.

D 1979

' AT IO NAL AGREEMENTS

By comparison with the high drama of the 1970 GM-UAW confrontation,
negotia tio ns for the National Agreement in 1973, 1976, and 1979 were
relatively routine affairs. In the first two instances another company was the
principal designated strike 'target', and settlements were reached at GM
without major strike action. GM was aga in made the ' target' company in 197 9,
but on th is occasion th e pa rti es concluded an agreement 14 September without
a strik e. That was the first time in fifteen years the union had not struck the
'pattern' auto firm.
In 1973 the company agreed that employees with thirty years' service could
retire rcgardles of age without reduced benefits. Comprehensive dent al
insu rance wa · al o provided. An innovation in 1973 was the establishment by
the parties of a ation al Committee to Improve the Quality of Work Life
(OWL). OWL programs a re now in operation in a bout 90 of GM 's 150 UAW
units . In l 976 the ' hardcore ' i sue was said to be the paid personal holiday plan .
The UAW characterized it a the first step toward an eventual four-day work
week in American indu try. New vision care and hea rin g aid pl ans were
int roduced in 1976 . A ma jor concern in 1979 was the creation of the National
Committee on Technological Progress, composed of three re present atives
from the union a nd three from the company who would meet monthl y to
di ·cus~ the development of new technology and its impact on the work
norm ally performed by employees in the UAW-represented bargaining unit.
In addit ion. throughout the e years, contracts provided for first-yea r wage
increases on the o rde r of 6 per cent and second- and third-yea r increa es of 3
per cent, exclusive of cost-of-living allowances, as well as improvements in
pensions, supple mental unemployment benefits, and medical , hospital , a nd
other gro up insurance benefits.

3. TH

1982 NAT IO

AL AGREEMENT

Beset by financia l woes brought on by the L980 rece ion, the auto companies
took the unprecedented step in 198 1 of asking th e UAW to reope n the
National Agreeme nt ea rl y and to grant substantial economic conce sio ns.
After resi ·ting nearly a yea r, th e union grudgingly a sented . Contract ta lk.
bega n with GM but collapsed in la te January 1982. Then, afte r a n accommod ation agreeme nt wa worked out with Ford in Febru ary, th e union returned for a
week of intensive nego tiations with GM, capped by a mara thon 37-hour
sess ion that produced an historic settlement o n 21 March 19 2. For the fir t
tim e eve r. th e union agreed to wage concessions or 'g ivebac k ' for GM a nd on
it s part GM offered assurances of greater job security. Th e new a ti ona l
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Agreem ent was to run two a nd a half years, until 14 Septe mbe r 1984. It wa s
subj ect to reopening any tim e afte r l January 1983, if retail de liveries return e d
to the highest leve ls of th e 1976-79 period. The UA W's 324-person GM
Nationa l Cou ncil approved th e contract overwhelmingly , but membership
ratificat io n fo ll owed by th e narrow ma rgin of 115 ,000 to 105,000 .
Under the 1982 ettlem ent , base wages were frozen for the term of the
contract. Three of the qua rte rly cost-of-living adjustments due in 1982 were
deferred fo r e ightee n month s each. The personal paid ho liday program wo n in
1976, unde r which workers would have received nine days off with pay in 1982,
was eliminated . In an effort to red uce a bsentee ism, the partie negotiated a
procedure for denying e mployees with a 20 per cent rate of 'co ntrollable
abse ntee ism ' a proportion of the ir e ntitl ement to holid ay , vacation pay,
sickness and accident benefits, and supplemental unemployment benefits.
In return for these concessions GM impo ed a 24-month moratorium o n
plant closings related to 'o utsourcing' or subcontracting and rescinded plans to
shut down four specified plants, thus savi ng 11 ,000 job . The company also
agreed to a 'guaranteed income strea m' fo r th e protection of high-se niority
workers threatened by layoffs and to experim ental 'li fetime job security' pilot
projects at four plants. In addition, th e new contract provided for a prepaid
legal services plan for employees and de pendents, discount. on car purchases,
and a pioneering profit-sharing pl an . Fin all y, the company and union
establi shed an Occupational Health Advisory Board , composed of five o utside
scientists, to advise the parties concerning th e occ upational health prob lems of
GM workers.
-1 . LO CA L AGREEME

TS

After the National Agreement is concluded, loca l union retain the a utho rity to
negoti ate their own local agreements. If necessa ry. and with the approval of the
Intern atio nal, they may strike their pl ant over unresolved local issue . A vital
function of each loca l contract is to tran slate the wage increa cs ct fort h in the
Natio na l Agreement, which are simpl y phrased in term of a specified number
of cent per hou r or a pe rcentage for e mpl oyees at di fferent wage levels, into a
definite rate for the broad array of va rio usly described jobs in each plant. In
ea rl y 1983, for exa mpl e. an un skill ed machin e operator in a typical manufacturing plant was ea rning $9.79 an ho ur and a sk ill ed tool and die make r
betwee n $11.81 and $12.01. In a body asse mbly pl ant. an un skilled gu n welder
wa ea rnin g $9.79 a n hour and a skill e d millin g machin e operator $11.8 1, o r
$12.00 if he was a ' leader' .
The Na tion a l Agreement spells o ut proced ures for ·etting production
standards (the quantity and quality of units to be produced in a given period of
time) but the s ubstantive criteria are esta blished by loca l management , subject
to objection by the union. Local agree me nts also see k to draw appropriate lines
of demarcation between the work of the sk ill ed trades classifications. In a local
agreement of some 150 pages o r o, a good half to two-thirds is likely to deal
with physical conditions of work, job assignment procedure , safety and health
problems, and a variety of mund ane matte r of intense practical concern to
individual employees and particula r gro up .
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Ill . GR I EVANCES AND ARB I TRAT I ON
A. STRUCTURE AND P R OCEDU R ES
I. TH

FOU R-ST E P G RI EVAN E PROCED U RE: STRIKE RIGHT S
AN D LIMITATIONS

Collective barga inin g in a very real sense is a continuous process. Since the
partie have co ncluded th e ir customa ry trienn ial forma l agreeme nts. they must
proceed to handle the co untle di putes th at arise daily on the plant floor or
elsewhere during the terms of tho e contracts. Many issues a re covered by
language in the writte n nat ional or loca l agreements, and thus technically their
resoluti on involves me re ly the inte rpretation and application of an ex istin g
contract. But settling other dispute , for exa mple , over new job cl assifications
or produ ctio n sta ndards, can o nl y be viewed realisticall y as th e formulation of a
fre sh new ag ree ment to deal with a n unanticipated problem. In a ny event, most
of the. e i. sue are proce. sed through th e selfsa me grievance procedure crea ted
by the pa rties' ational Agreement, which is quite aptly refe rre d to at certain
points in the contract a a 'bargai nin g procedure .
Th ere are four officia lly designated steps in the GM- AW grievance
procedure. and in addition a we ll-recognized ' half step' between the fir t two.
The first three step (or three and a ha lf) in volve bilateral dealing betwee n the
company and the union . The fourth a nd last ste p co n ists of the referral of an
issue to the part ie -' permanent umpire, an impartial third party jointly selected
by company and unio n, fo r a final and binding arbitratio n decision. The
o rdin ary seq ue nce is a follow ·:

Step

Procedure

One

An employee or a union committeeman o n his behalf
present a grieva nce to the forem an .
One and a ha lf The union committeeman , sometimes with a seco nd committeeman , takes up th e grieva nce with th e genera l fo re man.
Two
The union shop committee ta ke up th e grieva nce with th e
highe t loca l man age ment.
Three
The regional director of th e Inte rn ation a l Union appea l the
grievance to a joint union-co mpany appea l committee co nsisting of two union and two company rep rese nt a ti ves;
representatives of the union or company hea dquarte rs staff
may atte nd meetings of the appea l co mmittee.
Four
Within 2 1 days of any final decision of th e appea l commitee,
the unio n's regi ona l director or the co mpany may appea l the
grieva nce to th e imparti al umpire , who e decisio n is final and
binding.
The union and the company ag ree th at the re shall be no trik e or locko ut
during th e term of the contract concerning any matter o n which the umpire ha
ruled. or concern ing any othe r matte r until it has been discussed for at lea. t five
days at Step Three of the grievance procedure. The effect i th a t the unio n may
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lawfully strike over certain issues, e.g. production standards, eve n during the
life of an ag reement, once the union has exhausted its duty to bargain on the
question. Such authorized midterm strikes have becom e re lative ly rare in
recent year . Finally, the union is prohibited from strikin g over ·o me specified
issue that a re also excluded from arbitration be fore th e umpire . Th ese include
disputes ove r the pension plan , insurance program, up ple me ntal un e mployment benefit plan , employee stock ownership pl an. guara nteed income stream
benefit program , and profit sharing plan.

2. IMP A RTI A L

MPIR E : A U THORI TY A

D PRO

ED

R

S

The Nationa l Agreement empowers the imparti al umpire to reso lve a ll cl a ims
of discrimination because of union activity and to e nte rtai n mo t all ega tions
th at there have been violations of the provisions o f the Nat io na l Ag ree ment or
of local agreements dealing with the followin g s ubj ects: unio n recog nition and
repre entation; grievance procedure; seniority; di sciplin e and di scharge;
working hours and overtime; leaves of absence; e tabli hmen t o f new plants;
strike a nd lockouts; wage provisions but not the loca l wage sca le a uch;
apprentices; skilled trades; vacation and holid ay pay; and procedures for
handling disputes regarding production standa rd , but no t the merits of the
standards themselves.
In addition to production standards, the umpire is ex pressly excluded from
ruling on the clause in the National Agreem e nt wh e reby th e pa rti es wa ive their
rights generally to make new collective bargainin g dema nds du ring th e term of
an exi tin g contract. The umpire is also unabl e to pa so n di sputes in vo lving the
pen ion plan , insurance program, supple me nta l un e mployme nt be ne fit plan,
and the rest of the plans and prog rams previ o u ly mention e d ove r w hich the
union i precluded from striking. On on e impo rtant i. sue, subco nt ractin g, the
union has the option of going to the umpire o r of strikin g after goin g to Step
Three of the grievance procedure. Fin ally , th e re a re certa in ite ms, such as
health and safety, which are not explicitly menti o ned in e ith er t he a rbitration or
no-strike clauses. The union conte nds th at th e e i ·sues. like production
standard , are 'strikeable' .
The GM-UAW umpire ystem was esta bli shed in 1940. It · basic phil o ophy
of disinterested judgment coupl ed with fid elity to th e pa rties' own ag ree me nts
has remained essentially unch anged through th e yea rs. Sin ce 1940 the re have
been a total of ten full-time umpires (only on e at a tim e), p lus severa l assistants .
The GM-UAW umpireship is naturally on e of th e most presti gio us posts in the
arbitration field. Six umpires have served a preside nt · o f th e National
Academy of Arbitrators , th e principal profess iona l o rga niza tio n. a nd the
others were nationally known chol ars. No umpire decisio n has eve r failed to
achieve full compliance by th e pa rties .
In the early years as many a two hundred gri eva nces might be resolved
annually by the umpire. By th e l 950s th at fi gure was be low I 00 , and it has
continued to drop, despite a sub tanti al increase in th e numbe r of initial
grievances being written. In th e la te l 960s and th e I 9 70s, when the total
number of grievances filed ran ged be tween 200 ,000 and 300 ,000 annually, the
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umpire was usually handling only about 25 to 60. In 1981 and 1982 the
umpire's output was down to a mere five and six, respectively. The parties
attribute this remarkable reduction in caseload to the very succe s of the
syste m. A s they see it, the umpire over the years has laid down the principal
guide lines needed for the interpretation of the contract. His decisions are
trea ted as precedents, and now the parties themselves are generally able to
ag ree on how they should be applied to new situations. Some confirmation of
thi s a sess ment may be found in the fact that currently nearly all the cases going
to the umpire involve employee discharges , not contract interpretations.
The tre nd to ward a greate r proportion of disciplinary cases developed early,
as can be see n from th e following tabulation covering the years 1940-45 .

General Subject
Discipli ne
Job cl a. sifica ti on
wage ra te
Senio rity in
promot io ns, e tc.
Seniority in reca ll s,
etc.
Rights of
comm ittee men
O vert ime a nd ca ll-in
pay
Oth er~
T ota ls

1940
Cases
30

1940
%

20

1941
Cases
47

1941 /942-451942-45
%
Cases
%
20
160
49. 2

27

18

56

23

67

20

13

8.6

19

7.

27

8.3

l3

8.6

24

9.9

8

2.4

16

10.6

22

9

3

0. 9

19
32

12.6
21.3

24
51

9.9
20 .9

8
52

2.4
16.0

150

100

243

100

325

100

Tod ay a hea ring befo re th e umpire is som ething of a major eve nt. A
I 00-pcr ·o n a udie nce may be on hand. Each sid e pre e nts a pre hearing bri ef,
offe r test imo ny th ro ugh witn esses, and submits exhibits. Ordina rily the re a re
no po thea ring brief. . The uni o n seldom uses lawye r ; th e company is mo re
li ke ly to have an atto rney. Pe rsons handling arbit ra ti ons for th e pa rties have
traditi o na ll y bee n rising fi gures in their organization ; severa l have go ne o n to
become unio n o r company vice presidents. Th e umpire is not unde r a
contractua l tim e limit in re ndering a decision , but he u uall y see ks to issue an
award within thirty day . O ve r th e years the company ha pre vail ed about 60 to
70 per ce nt of the tim e.
A lt ho ugh onl y half a doze n cases may actually result in a n umpire' decisio n
in a give n yea r, som e 1,000 grievances may be form a ll y 'docke te d' fo r
a rbitrat io n a nnua lly. Tea m of representatives from th e company's and the
unio n's a rb itra tio n sta ff then ' ride circuit', visiting pl ant sites throu ghout the
coun try. tho roughl y in ve tigating the various ca es at th e locati o ns wh ere they
arose, a nd ee king mutua lly satisfactory bases for ·ettling th e di spute with o ut
a n arbi tra ti o n hearing . In the ove rwhelming maj o rity o f in sta nces th ey ucceed .
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B. DISPUTES AT PLANT LEVEL
Di pute resolution between GM and the UAW at the local level is exemplified
by the experience at the Chevrolet-Livonia and the Fisher Body-Fleetwood
plants, both located in the Detroit metropolitan area. In normal time the
Chevrolet operation, which manufactures springs, bumpers, and sim il ar item ·,
employs about 2,000 production workers and 1,000 . killed tradesmen .
Fleetwood in the late 1970s had about 5,000 hourly workers and in addition
about 500 salaried workers. The latter plant assemble.- top-of-the-line
automobile bodies for Cadillac (over 700 dail y). At both Chevrolet-Livoni a
and Fleetwood the primary respo nsibility for negotiat ing local agree me nt and
handling grievances rests with the union 's shop committee, consistin g of a
chairman and six committeemen elected by th e membership for three- or
two-year terms, and with the plant's per onnel director, hi as istant. and two
or three labor relations represe ntatives from different shifts.
The pattern of formal written grievances over the pa. t decade a t Chevrolet-Livonia has been as follows:

No. of Employees
Total grievances
Per l 00 employees
Disciplinary grievances
Percentage of all
discipline grieved

1970

1973

1978

1981

2,761
398
14.4
183

3,343
1,452
43.4
598

3.324
l,796
54.0
660

2,502
686
27.4
249

21%

23'¾,

31%

26%

Chevrolet's mid-1970s record of approximately one formal grievance for every
two employees per year is typical of the GM-UAW relation . hip through the
years. On the other hand. about five or six per cent of al l grieva nces
company-wide may relate to the potentially 'strik eabte· issue of production
standards, while at Chevrolet there may be a few as three s uch grievances out
of a total of 1,000 of all kinds.
In recent years grievances at Chevrolet have been settled as fo llows at the
various steps:

1980
Step 1 (foreman)
}
Step H (general foreman)
Step 2 (plant management)
Step 3 (corporation)
Step 4 (umpire)

479
3
0

57
281
336
42
0

908

716

426

Totals

/981

Fleetwood, the Fisher assembly plant, was a pioneer in introducing a 'quality
of work life' (OWL) program in th e late 1970.-. This is a joint union-company
effort to give employees a systematic opportunity to participate in management
decision-making on the plant floor, and to provide them with more congenial
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and satisfying working lives. Staffed by two full-time coordinators and four
full-time 'facilitators', half of them drawn from the union and half from the
company , the program is credited with helpin g to produce a dramatic reduction
in formal grievances during the past five years. The QWL project may also have
assisted in bringing worker absenteeism down from 7 per cent to 3 per cent at
Fleetwood.
The decline in the writing of grievances at Fleetwood during this five-year
span can be traced in these figures:
1978
5,406
6,127
1 J 3.3

No. employees
Total grievances
Per I 00 e mployees

1980
2,737
1,407
51.4

1982
3 ,200 (est.)
930 (est.)
29 (est.)

In 1978 there was an average of 273 formal di ciplinary actions per month , 44
per cent of which resulted in grievances. In 1982 the average monthly
disciplinary rate was down to 26, or less than 10 per cent of the 1978 rate (with
only about a 40 per cent re duction in the work force), and of these 26 only 28
per cent were protested. In the mid-1970s there were 500 to 700 grievances on
production tandards a year; in the early 1980s these were down to about
50-100 annua ll y.
Settlement of grievances at Fleetwood in the last few years have occurred at
the various steps as fo ll ows:

Step
Step
Step
Step

I
2
3
4

(forema n & general foreman)
(plant management)
(corpora tion)
(umpire)
Totals

1978
5,5 03
0
693
1

1979
5,260
0
415
1

1980
2,903
2
99
0

6. 196

5,676

3,004

Significantly, an increasing proportion of all grievances are being handled
entirely at the plant level.
Union and management representatives at both Chevrolet and Fleetwood
stress that one of the best signs of a healthy relationship between the parties is a
willingness to reso lve disputes through informal oral discussions without reso rt
to an officia l written grievance. At Chevrolet the as istant personn e l director
estimated 'conservatively' that the number of oral complaints routinely
dispo ed of was double or triple the number of grievance formally processed.
The union shop chairman similarly thought that roughly 70 per cent of all
matters we re e ttl ed orally. One of the major indication of the rece nt
turnaround in attitude at Fleetwood has been the extraordinary decline in
written grievances. In 1978 almost every grievance was automatically 'written
up' . Today 80 per cent of the issues that ari e may be resolved without a
writing.
Absenteeism is pinpointed by management at both Chevrolet and Fleetwood a a persi ·ting problem, even though attendance ha improved substan-
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tially in the last few years. 'There are a lot of tedious jobs in the auto industry',
one official observed. 'Members of the '60s generation are less materialistic
than their elders. They want to enjoy life, and they' re willing to give up pay so
they can .' Union representatives are understandably more reluctant to concede
the existence of absenteeism troubles, but they have cooperated with
management to establish absenteeism counseling teams. For union official·.
the principal villain at the loca l level seems to be the company's alleged crossing
of craft demarcation lines and the inva ion of estab li shed work juri diction
through technological innovations.
Both company and union representatives see a le ·ening of hosti litie.
between them , partl y in re ponse to the economic ill. afflicting today' a uto
indu try. 'The ha rd-nosed militancy of the past has been toned down',
commented a company personnel man. 'Everybody is more professional, more
appreciative of others' opinions.' 'We've got to communicate', said another.
'Joint projects are the wave of the future.' 'Once I thought I might become a
priest and help people better themselve th at way', concluded a union
representative. 'Now I'm going to get them to work together and do it here.'
With due a llowance for the possibility of some posturing to impre ·s the visitor
from academe, those are encouraging sentiments to find expressed at the grass
roots of contemporary labor relations.

IV. CONCLUSION

The GM-UAW relationsh ip is viewed ery differently by different people.
Some industrial re lations experts have hailed it as 'enlightened' and 'ci ilized',
an admirable model of so und , responsible collective bargaining. Others.
especia ll y in more prosperous time , ha ve charged that the company and the
union had become too close. too 'cozy'. and that their con tract settleme nts
were inflationary - with higher wages being pas eel on to consumers through
highe r prices- and thu injurious to the public interest. For almost half the GM
worker , who voted against ratification of the 1982 ational greement, the
union i obviously not doing enough. Most outside observers believe. however,
that th e ettlement, with its trade-off between economic concession and
increased job security, wa a wis and prudent . tep, benefiting not only the
parties but also the nation 's economy.
The UAW represents a rem a rkably diverse and often feisty collection of
workers. In Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis and other urban center there are
large numbers of blacks, many in disagreeable jobs that breed restles ness and
disaffection. At the same time the union has always had a large element of
white migrants from the South and immig rants from Middle and Eastern
Europe. Some racial antagonisms a re almost inevitable. In recent years the
union and the company have done a commendable job of damping down these
tension .
Finally, it should be emphasized that even if the union's and the company's
leader were always the mo t rea o nab le. humane, and farsighted of persons,
they operate under severe constraints in dealing with one anot her. GM's
ultimate allegiance must be to optimal return on investment. in ·1 period when
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fore ign co mpetition i inten ·e a nd when the tastes of the American public
swing wildly between large a nd sma ll cars, dependin g o n th e availability of
OPEC oi l. GM courts mark et disaster in not exploiting fully the advantages of
technolog ica l innovation . It courts labor uprisings by moving too swiftl y to
repl ace men with machin es . On its side , the union is run by officials who must
stand for election every two or three years, and who can accomplish almost
nothin g, however noble th eir aspirations, if they are defeate d. 'The political
nature of a labo r orga niza tion cannot be underestimated ', says a top GM
negotiato r, with much justification. The union people themselves put the
matter more tartly: ' In the e nd you 've got to get it by the boys.' This of course is
the task faced by any political leader in a democracy . Perhaps, then , it is
app ropriate that thi s largest and most imposing of the country's collective
ba rgaining relatio nships should ex hibit so strikingly both the strengths a nd th e
weaknesses inherent in a de mocra tic society.
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